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Abstract
Achieving secure communications in networks has been one of the most important
problems in information technology. Dolev, Dwork, Waarts, and Yung have studied
secure message transmission in one-way or two-way channels. They only consider the
case when all channels are two-way or all channels are one-way. Goldreich, Goldwasser,
and Linial, Franklin and Yung, Franklin and Wright, and Wang and Desmedt have
studied secure communication and secure computation in multi-recipient (multicast)
models. In a “multicast channel” (such as Ethernet), one processor can send the same
message—simultaneously and privately—to a fixed subset of processors. In this paper,
we shall study necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving secure communications
against active adversaries in mixed one-way and two-way channels. We also discuss
multicast channels and neighbor network channels.
Keywords: network security, privacy, reliability, network connectivity
1 Introduction
If there is a private and authenticated channel between two parties, then secure communica-
tion between them is guaranteed. However, in most cases, many parties are only indirectly
connected, as elements of an incomplete network of private and authenticated channels. In
other words they need to use intermediate or internal nodes. Achieving participants cooper-
ation in the presence of faults is a major problem in distributed networks. Original work on
secure distributed computation assumed a complete graph for secure and reliable commu-
nication. Dolev, Dwork, Waarts, and Yung [5] were able to reduce the size of the network
graph by providing protocols that achieve private and reliable communication without the
need for the parties to start with secret keys. The interplay of network connectivity and
secure communication has been studied extensively (see, e.g., [1, 2, 4, 5, 11]). For example,
Dolev [4] and Dolev et al. [5] showed that, in the case of k Byzantine faults, reliable com-
munication is achievable only if the system’s network is 2k+1 connected. They also showed
∗An extended abstract of this paper has appeared in [3]
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that if all the paths are one way, then 3k + 1 connectivity is necessary and sufficient for
reliable and private communications. However they did not prove any results for the general
case when there are certain number of directed paths in one direction and another number
of directed paths in the other direction. While undirected graphs correspond naturally to
the case of pairwise two-way channels, directed graphs do not correspond to the case of
all-one-way or all-two-way channels considered in [5], but to the mixed case where there are
some paths in one direction and some paths in the other direction. In this paper, we will
initiate the study in this direction by showing what can be done with a general directed
graph. Note that this scenario is important in practice, in particular, when the network is
not symmetric. For example, a channel from A to B is cheap and a channel from B to A is
expensive but not impossible. Another example is that A has access to more resources than
B does.
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [10], Franklin and Yung [8], Franklin and Wright [7],
and Wang and Desmedt [17] have studied secure communication and secure computation
in multi-recipient (multicast) models. In a “multicast channel” (such as Ethernet), one
participant can send the same message—simultaneously and privately—to a fixed subset
of participants. Franklin and Yung [8] have given a necessary and sufficient condition for
individuals to exchange private messages in multicast models in the presence of passive ad-
versaries (passive gossipers). For the case of active Byzantine adversaries, many results have
been presented by Franklin and Wright [7], and, Wang and Desmedt [17]. Note that Goldre-
ich, Goldwasser, and Linial [10] have also studied fault-tolerant computation in the public
multicast model (which can be thought of as the largest possible multirecipient channels) in
the presence of active Byzantine adversaries. Specifically, Goldreich, et al. [10] have made
an investigation of general fault-tolerant distributed computation in the full-information
model. In the full information model no restrictions are made on the computational power
of the faulty parties or the information available to them. (Namely, the faulty players may
be infinitely powerful and there are no private channels connecting pairs of honest players).
In particular, they present efficient two-party protocols for fault-tolerant computation of any
bivariate function.
There are many examples of multicast channels (see, e.g. [7]), such as an Ethernet bus or
a token ring. Another example is a shared cryptographic key. By publishing an encrypted
message, a participant initiates a multicast to the subset of participants that is able to
decrypt it.
We present our model in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we study secure message
transmission over directed graphs. Section 6 is devoted to reliable message transmission
over hypergraphs, and Section 7 is devoted to secure message transmission over neighbor
networks.
2 Model
We will abstract away the concrete network structures and consider directed graphs. A
directed graph is a graph G(V,E) where all edges have directions. For a directed graph
G(V,E) and two nodes A,B ∈ V , throughout this paper, n denotes the number of vertex
disjoint paths between the two nodes and k denotes the number of faults under the control of
the adversary. We write |S| to denote the number of elements in the set S. We write x ∈R S
to indicate that x is chosen with respect to the uniform distribution on S. Let F be a finite
field, and let a, b, c,M ∈ F. We define auth(M ; a, b) := aM + b (following [7, 9, 14, 15]) and
auth(M ; a, b, c) := aM2+ bM + c (following [17]). Note that each authentication key key =
(a, b) can be used to authenticate one message M without revealing any information about
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any component of the authentication key and that each authentication key key = (a, b, c)
can be used to authenticate two messages M1 and M2 without revealing any information
about any component of the authentication key. We will also use a function 〈. . .〉 which maps
a variable size (we assume that this variable size is bounded by a pre-given bound) ordered
subset of F to an image element in a field extension F∗ of F, and from any image element
we can uniquely and efficiently recover the ordered subset. Let k and n be two integers
such that 0 ≤ k < n ≤ 3k + 1. A (k + 1)-out-of-n secret sharing scheme is a probabilistic
function S: F → Fn with the property that for any M ∈ F and S(M) = (v1, . . . , vn), no
information of M can be inferred from any k entries of (v1, . . . , vn), andM can be recovered
from any k + 1 entries of (v1, . . . , vn). The set of all possible (v1, . . . , vn) is called a code
and its elements codewords. We say that a (k+1)-out-of-n secret sharing scheme can detect
k′ errors if given any codeword (v1, . . . , vn) and any tuple (u1, . . . , un) over F such that
0 < |{i : ui 6= vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| ≤ k′ one can detect that (u1, . . . , un) is not a codeword.
If the code is Maximal Distance Separable, then the maximum value of errors that can be
detected is n − k − 1 [12]. We say that the (k + 1)-out-of-n secret sharing scheme can
correct k′ errors if from any S(M) = (v1, . . . , vn) and any tuple (u1, . . . , un) over F with
|{i : ui 6= vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| ≤ k′ one can recover the secret m. If the code is Maximal
Distance Separable, then the maximum value of errors that allows the recovery of the vector
(v1, . . . , vn) is (n − k − 1)/2 [12]. A (k + 1)-out-of-n Maximal Distance Separable (MDS)
secret sharing scheme is a (k+ 1)-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with the property that for
any k′ ≤ (n−k−1)/2, one can correct k′ errors and simultaneously detect n−k−k′−1 errors
(as follows easily by generalizing [12, p. 10]). Maximal Distance Separable (MDS) secret
sharing schemes can be constructed from any MDS codes, for example, from Reed-Solomon
code [13].
In a message transmission protocol, the sender A starts with a message MA drawn from
a message space M with respect to a certain probability distribution. At the end of the
protocol, the receiver B outputs a message MB. We consider a synchronous system in
which messages are sent via multicast in rounds. During each round of the protocol, each
node receives any messages that were multicast for it at the end of the previous round, flips
coins and perform local computations, and then possibly multicasts a message. We will also
assume that the message space M is a subset of a finite field F.
We consider two kinds of adversaries. A passive adversary (or gossiper adversary) is an
adversary who can only observe the traffic through k internal nodes. An active adversary (or
Byzantine adversary) is an adversary with unlimited computational power who can control
k internal nodes. That is, an active adversary will not only listen to the traffics through the
controlled nodes, but also control the message sent by those controlled nodes. Both kinds
of adversaries are assumed to know the complete protocol specification, message space, and
the complete structure of the graph. In this paper, we will not consider a dynamic adversary
who could change the nodes it controls from round to round, instead we will only consider
static adversaries. That is, at the start of the protocol, the adversary chooses the k faulty
nodes. An alternative interpretation is that k nodes are static collaborating adversaries.
For any execution of the protocol, let adv be the adversary’s view of the entire protocol.
We write adv(M, r) to denote the adversary’s view when MA =M and when the sequence
of coin flips used by the adversary is r.
Definition 2.1 (see Franklin and Wright [7])
1. Let δ < 12 . A message transmission protocol is δ-reliable if, with probability at least
1 − δ, B terminates with MB = MA. The probability is over the choices of MA and
the coin flips of all nodes.
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2. A message transmission protocol is reliable if it is 0-reliable.
3. A message transmission protocol is ε-private if, for every two messages M0,M1 and
every r,
∑
c |Pr[adv(M0, r) = c]−Pr[adv(M1, r) = c]| ≤ 2ε. The probabilities are taken
over the coin flips of the honest parties, and the sum is over all possible values of the
adversary’s view.
4. A message transmission protocol is perfectly private if it is 0-private.
5. A message transmission protocol is (ε, δ)-secure if it is ε-private and δ-reliable.
6. An (ε, δ)-secure message transmission protocol is efficient if its round complexity and
bit complexity are polynomial in the size of the network, log 1
ε
(if ε > 0) and log 1
δ
(if
δ > 0).
For two nodes A and B in a directed graph such that there are 2k + 1 node disjoint paths
from A to B, there is a straightforward reliable message transmission from A to B against
a k-active adversary: A sends the message m to B via all the 2k + 1 paths, and B recovers
the message m by a majority vote.
3 (0, δ)-Secure message transmission in directed graphs
Our discussion in this section will be concentrated on directed graphs. Dolev, Dwork,
Waarts, and Yung [5] addressed the problem of secure message transmissions in a point-to-
point network. In particular, they showed that if all channels from A to B are one-way, then
(3k+1)-connectivity is necessary and sufficient for (0,0)-secure message transmissions from
A to B against a k-active adversary. They also showed that if all channels between A and B
are two-way, then (2k + 1)-connectivity is necessary and sufficient for (0,0)-secure message
transmissions between A and B against a k-active adversary. In this section we assume that
there are only 2k + 1 − u directed node disjoint paths from A to B, where 1 ≤ u ≤ k. We
show that u directed node disjoint paths from B to A are necessary and sufficient to achieve
(0, δ)-secure message transmissions from A to B against a k-active adversary.
Franklin and Wright [7] showed that even if all channels between A and B are two way,
2k + 1 channels between A and B are still necessary for (1 − δ)-reliable (assuming that
δ < 12
(
1− 1|F|
)
) message transmission from A to B against a k-active adversary.
Theorem 3.1 (Frandlin and Wright [7]) Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V , and
there are only 2k two-way node disjoint paths between A and B in G. Then δ-reliable message
transmission from A to B against a k-active adversary is impossible for δ < 12
(
1− 1|F|
)
.
In the following, we first show that if there is no directed path from B to A, then 2k+1
directed paths from A to B is necessary and sufficient for (0, δ)-secure message transmission
from A to B.
Theorem 3.2 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V , and 0 < δ < 12 . If there is
no directed paths from B to A, then the necessary and sufficient condition for (0, δ)-secure
message transmission from A to B against a k-active adversary is that there are 2k + 1
directed node disjoint paths from A to B.
Proof. The necessity is proved in Theorem 3.1. Let p1, . . . , p2k+1 be the 2k+1 directed
node disjoint paths from A to B. Let MA ∈ F be the secret that A wants to send to B. A
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constructs (k+1)-out-of-(2k+1) secret shares (sA1 , . . . , s
A
2k+1) ofM
A. The protocol proceeds
from round 1 through round 2k + 1. In each round 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1, we have the following
steps:
Step 1 A chooses {(aAi,j , b
A
i,j) ∈R F
2 : 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k + 1}.
Step 2 A sends (sAi , auth(s
A
i ; a
A
i,1, b
A
i,1), . . . , auth(s
A
i ; a
A
i,2k+1, b
A
i,2k+1)) to B via path pi, and
sends (aAi,j , b
A
i,j) to B via path pj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k + 1.
Step 3 B receives (sBi , c
B
i,1, . . . , c
B
i,2k+1) via path pi, and receives (a
B
i,j , b
B
i,j) via path pj for
each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k + 1.
Step 4 B computes t = |{j : cBi,j = auth(s
B
i ; a
B
i,j , b
B
i,j)}|. If t ≥ k + 1, then B decides that
sBi is a valid share. Otherwise B discards s
B
i .
It is easy to check that after the round 2k + 1, with high probability, B will get at least
k + 1 valid shares of sA. Thus, with high probability, B will recover the secret MB =MA.
It is straightforward that the protocol achieves perfect privacy. Thus the above protocol
is a (0, δ)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active adversary.
Q.E.D. ✷
By Theorem 3.1, the necessary condition for (0, δ)-secure message transmission from A to
B against a k-active adversary is that there are at least k + 1 node disjoint paths from A
to B and there are at least 2k + 1 node disjoint paths in total from A to B and from B to
A. In the following, we show that this condition is also sufficient. We first show that the
condition is sufficient for k = 1.
Theorem 3.3 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V . If there are two directed node
disjoint paths p0 and p1 from A to B, and one directed path q (which is node disjoint from p0
and p1) from B to A, then for any 0 < δ <
1
2 , there is a (0, δ)-secure message transmission
protocol from A to B against a 1-active adversary.
Proof. In the following protocol, A (0, δ)-securely transmits a message MA ∈ F to B.
Step 1 A chooses sA0 ∈R F, (a
A
0 , b
A
0 ), (a
A
1 , b
A
1 ) ∈R F
2, and let sA1 = M
A − sA0 . For each
i ∈ {0, 1}, A sends (sAi , (a
A
i , b
A
i ), auth(s
A
i ; a
A
1−i, b
A
1−i)) to B via path pi.
Step 2 Assumes that B receives (sBi , (a
B
i , b
B
i ), c
B
i ) via path pi. B checks whether c
B
i =
auth(sBi ; a
B
1−i, b
B
1−i) for i = 0, 1. If both equations hold, then B knows that with
high probability the adversary was either passive or not on the paths from A
to B. B can recover the secret message, sends “OK” to A via the path q, and
terminates the protocol. Otherwise, one of equations does not hold and B knows
that the adversary was on one of the paths from A to B. In this case, B chooses
(aB , bB) ∈R F2, and sends ((aB, bB), (sB0 , (a
B
0 , b
B
0 ), c
B
0 ), (s
B
1 , (a
B
1 , b
B
1 ), c
B
1 )) to A via
the path q.
Step 3 If A receives “OK”, then A terminates the protocol. Otherwise, from the informa-
tion A received via path q, A decides which path from A to B is corrupted and
recovers B’s authentication key (aA, bA). A sends (MA, auth(MA; aA, bA)) to B
via the uncorrupted path from A to B.
Step 4 B recovers the message and checks that the authenticator is correct.
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, it can be shown that the above protocol is (0, δ)-
secure against a 1-active adversary. Q.E.D. ✷
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Theorem 3.4 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V , and k ≥ u ≥ 1. If there are
2k + 1 − u directed node disjoint paths p1, . . ., p2k+1−u from A to B, and u directed node
disjoint paths q1, . . ., qu (q1, . . ., qu are node disjoint from p1, . . ., p2k+1−u) from B to A,
then for any 0 < δ < 12 , there is an efficient (0, δ)-secure message transmission protocol from
A to B against a k-active adversary.
Before we give an efficient (0, δ)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B. We
first demonstrate the underlying idea by giving a non-efficient (exponential in k) (0, δ)-secure
message transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active adversary. Let MA ∈ F be
the secret that A wants to send to B, and P1, . . . ,Pt be an enumeration of size k+1 subsets
of {p1, . . . , p2k+1−u, q1, . . . , qu}. The protocol proceeds from round 1 through t. In each
round 1 ≤ m ≤ t, we have the following steps:
Step 1 For each pi ∈ Pm, A chooses (aAi,m, b
A
i,m) ∈R F
2 and sends (aAi,m, b
A
i,m) to B via pi.
Step 2 For each pi ∈ Pm, B receives (aBi,m, b
B
i,m) from A via pi.
Step 3 For each qi ∈ Pm, B chooses (cBi,m, d
B
i,m) ∈R F
2 and sends (cBi,m, d
B
i,m) to A via qi.
Step 4 For each qi ∈ Pm, A receives (cAi,m, d
A
i,m) from B via qi.
Step 5 A computes CA =
∑
pi∈Pm
aAi,m+
∑
qi∈Pm
cAi,m, D
A =
∑
pi∈Pm
bAi,m+
∑
qi∈Pm
dAi,m,
and sends (MA + CA, auth(MA + CA;CA, DA)) to B via all paths in pi in Pm.
Step 6 For each pi ∈ Pm, B receives (eBi,m, f
B
i,m) from A via pi.
Step 7 If (eBi,m, f
B
i,m) = (e
B
j,m, f
B
j,m) for all pi, pj ∈ Pm, then B goes to Step 8. Otherwise,
B goes to round m+ 1.
Step 8 B computes CB =
∑
pi∈Pm
aBi,m+
∑
qi∈Pm
cBi,m, D
B =
∑
pi∈Pm
bBi,m+
∑
qi∈Pm
dBi,m.
Step 9 If fBi,m = auth(f
B
i,m;C
B, DB), then B computes the secret MB = fBi,m − C
B and
terminates the protocol. Otherwise, B goes to round m+ 1.
Since there is at least one Pm such that all paths in Pm are not corrupted, B receives the
correct secret by the end of the protocol with high probability. It is also straightforward to
check that the above protocol has perfect secrecy.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 3.4) Let MA ∈ F be the secret that A wants to send to B. A
constructs (k + 1)-out-of-(2k + 1− u) secret shares (sA1 , . . . , s
A
2k+1−u) of M
A. The protocol
proceeds from round 1 through 2k+ 2+ u. For each round 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k+ 1− u, we have the
following steps:
Step 1 A chooses {(aAi,j , b
A
i,j) ∈R F
2, : 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k + 1− u}.
Step 2 A sends {sAi , auth(s
A
i ; a
A
i,1, b
A
i,1), . . ., auth(s
A
i ; a
A
i,2k+1−u, b
A
i,2k+1−u)} to B via path
pi, and sends (a
A
i,j , b
A
i,j) to B via path pj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k + 1− u.
Step 3 B receives {sBi , d
B
i,1, . . . , d
B
i,2k+1−u} via path pi, and (a
B
i,j , b
B
i,j) via path pj for each
1 ≤ j ≤ 2k + 1− u.
Step 4 B computes t = |{j : dBi,j = auth(s
B
i ; a
B
i,j , b
B
i,j)}|. If t ≥ k + 1, then B decides that
sBi is a valid share. Otherwise B decides that s
B
i is an invalid share.
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At the end of round 2k + 1 − u, if B has received k + 1 valid shares, then B recovers the
secret MB from these valid shares and terminates the protocol. Otherwise, B proceeds to
round 2k + 2− u. In round 2k + 2− u, we have the following steps:
Step 1 A chooses {(aAi , b
A
i , c
A
i ) ∈R F
3 : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1 − u}, and sends (aAi , b
A
i , c
A
i ) to B
via path pi for each i ≤ 2k + 1− u.
Step 2 For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k+1−u, B receives (aBi , b
B
i , c
B
i ) on path pi from A (if no value
is received on path pi, B sets it to a default value).
Step 3 For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k+1−u,B chooses rBi ∈R F and computes β
B = {(rBi , auth(r
B
i ; a
B
i , b
B
i , c
B
i )) :
1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1− u}.
In each round 2k + 3− u ≤ i ≤ 2k + 2, we have the following steps:
Step 1 B chooses (dBi , e
B
i ) ∈R F
2 and {(vBi,j , w
B
i,j) ∈R F
2 : 1 ≤ j ≤ u}.
Step 2 B sends (dBi , e
B
i ), β
B , and {auth(〈dBi , e
B
i 〉; v
B
i,j , w
B
i,j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ u} to A via path qi,
and (vBi,j , w
B
i,j) to A via path qj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ u.
Step 3 A receives (or substitutes default values) (dAi , e
A
i ), β
A
i , and {α
A
i,j : 1 ≤ j ≤ u} from
B via path qi, and (v
A
i,j , w
A
i,j) from B via path qj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ u.
According to the values that A has received, A divides the paths set {q1, . . . , qu} into subsets
Q1, . . . ,Qt such that for any l,m, n with 1 ≤ l ≤ t, 1 ≤ m,n ≤ u, and qm, qn ∈ Ql, we have
1. βAm = β
A
n ;
2. αAm,n = auth(〈d
B
m, e
B
m〉; v
B
m,n, w
B
m,n);
3. αAn,m = auth(〈d
B
n , e
B
n 〉; v
B
n,m, w
B
n,m).
For each Ql, let qm ∈ Ql and βAm = {(r
A
i,l, γ
A
i,l) : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k+1−u}. A computes the number
tl = |{i : γ
A
i,l = auth(r
A
i,l; a
A
i , b
A
i , c
A
i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1− u}|+ |Ql|
If tl ≤ k, then A decides that Ql is an unacceptable set, otherwise, A decides that Ql is an
acceptable set. Let Ql = ∅ for t < l ≤ u.
For each round 2k + 3 ≤ l ≤ 2k + 2 + u, we have the following steps:
Step 1 If Ql = ∅ or Ql is an unacceptable set, then go to round l + 1.
Step 2 A computes Pl = {pi : γAi,l = auth(r
A
i,l; a
A
i , b
A
i , c
A
i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1 − u}, C
A
l =∑
pi∈Pl
aAi +
∑
qi∈Ql
dAi , and D
A
l =
∑
pi∈Pl
bAi +
∑
qi∈Ql
eAi .
Step 3 A sends (〈Ql,Pl,MA+CAl 〉, auth(〈Ql,Pl,M
A+CAl 〉;C
A
l , D
A
l )) to B via all paths
pi ∈ Pl.
Step 4 B receives (αBi,l, β
B
i,l) from path pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1− u.
Step 5 For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k+1−u, B computes αBi,l = 〈Q
B
i,l,P
B
i,l, β
B
i,l〉, C
B
i,l =
∑
pj∈Pi,l
aBj +∑
qj∈Qi,l
dBj , and D
B
i,l =
∑
pj∈Pi,l
bBj +
∑
qj∈Qi,l
eBj .
Step 6 For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1 − u, B checks whether βBi,l = auth(α
B
i,l;C
B
i,l, D
B
i,l). If the
equation holds, then B computes the secret MB = βBi,l − C
B
i,l.
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If B has not got the secret at the end of round 2k+1− u, then there exists an uncorrupted
path qj from B to A and a paths set Ql such that qj ∈ Ql and the information that A
receives from paths in Ql are reliable. Thus, at the end of round 2k + 2 + u, B will output
a secret MB. It is easy to check that, with high probability, this secret is the same as MA.
It is straightforward to show that the protocol achieves perfect privacy. Thus it is a
(0, δ)-secure message transmission transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active
adversary. Q.E.D. ✷
4 (0, 0)-Secure message transmission in directed graphs
In the previous section, we addressed probabilistic reliable message transmission in directed
graphs. In this section, we consider perfectly reliable message transmission in directed
graphs. We will show that if there are u directed node disjoint paths from B to A, then a
necessary and sufficient condition for (0, 0)-secure message transmission from A to B against
a k-active adversary is that there are max{3k+1− 2u, 2k+1} directed node disjoint paths
from A to B.
Theorem 4.1 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V . Assume that there are u directed
node disjoint paths from B to A. Then a necessary condition for (0, 0)-secure message
transmission from A to B against a k-active adversary is that there are max{3k + 1 −
2u, 2k + 1} directed node disjoint paths from A to B.
Proof. If u = 0, then by the results in [5], we need 3k + 1 directed node disjoint paths
from A to B for (0, 0)-secure message transmission against a k-active adversary. If u ≥ ⌈k2 ⌉,
then again by the results in [5], we need 2k+1 directed node disjoint paths from A to B for
0-reliable (that is, perfectly reliable) message transmission from A to B against a k-active
adversary. From now on, we assume that 0 < u < ⌈k2⌉.
For a contradiction, we assume that there are only 3k − 2u directed node disjoint paths
from A to B, denoted as p1, . . . , p3k−2u. Let q1, . . . , qu be the directed node disjoint paths
from B to A.
Let Π be a (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B. In the following,
we will construct a k-active adversary to defeat this protocol. The transcripts distribution
viewAΠ of A is drawn from a probability distribution that depends on the message M
A to
be transmitted by A, the coin flips RA of A, the coin flips RB of B, the coin flips RA of
the adversary (without loss of generality, we assume that the value RA will determine the
choice of faulty paths controlled by the adversary), and the coin flips RT of all other honest
nodes. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the protocol proceeds in steps, where
A is silent during even steps and B is silent during odd steps (see [5]).
The strategy of the adversary is as follows. First it uses RA to choose a value b. If b = 0,
then it uses RA again to choose k directed paths pa1 , . . . , pak from A to B and controls the
first node on each of these k paths. If b = 1, then it uses RA again to choose k− u directed
paths pa1 , . . . , pak−u from A to B and controls the first node on each of these k − u paths
and the first node on each of the u paths from B to A. It also uses RA to choose a message
MˆA ∈ F according to the same probability distribution from which the actual message MA
was drawn. In the following we describe the protocol the adversary will follow.
• Case b = 0. The k paths pa1 , . . . , pak behaves as a passive adversary. That is, it
proceeds according to the protocol Π.
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• Case b = 1. The k − u paths pa1 , . . . , pak−u ignores what A sends in each step of the
protocol and simulates what A would send to B when A sending MˆA to B. The u
paths from B ignores what B sends in each step of the protocol and simulates what
B would send to A when b = 0.
In the following, we assume that the tuple (MA, RA, RB, RT , RA) is fixed, b = 0, the protocol
halts in l steps, and the view of A is viewAΠ(M
A, RA, RB, RT , RA). Let αAi,j be the values
that A sends on path pi in step j and ~α
A
i = (α
A
i,1, . . . , α
A
i,l). We can view ~α
A
i as shares of
the message MA. Similarly, let αBi,j be the values that B receives on path pi in step j and
~αBi = (α
B
i,1, . . . , α
B
i,l).
First, it is straightforward to show that for any k paths pa1 , . . . , pak from A to B, there
is an RˆA1 such that b = 0, the adversary controls the paths pa1 , . . . , pak , and
viewAΠ(M
A, RA, RB, RT , RA) = viewAΠ(M
A, RA, RB, RT , RˆA1 ) (1)
Due to the fact that Π is a perfectly private message transmission protocol, from any
k shares from (~αA1 , ~α
A
2 , . . . , ~α
A
3k−2u) one cannot recover the secret message M
A. Thus
(~αA1 , ~α
A
2 , . . . , ~α
A
3k−2u) is at least a (k + 1)-out-of-(3k− 2u) secret sharing scheme.
Secondly, for any k−u paths pa1 , . . . , pak−u from A to B, there is an Rˆ
A
2 such that b = 1,
MˆA 6=MA, the adversary controls the paths pa1 , . . . , pak−u , q1, . . . , qu, and
viewAΠ(M
A, RA, RB, RT , RA) = viewAΠ(M
A, RA, RB, RT , RˆA2 ) (2)
Due to the fact that Π is a perfectly reliable message transmission protocol, any k−u errors
in the shares (~αB1 , ~α
B
2 , . . . , ~α
B
3k−2u) can be corrected by B to recover the secret messageM
A.
In summary, (~αA1 , ~α
A
2 , . . . , ~α
A
3k−2u) is at least a (k + 1)-out-of-(3k − 2u) secret sharing
scheme that can correct k − u errors. By the results in [12], we know that the maximum
number of errors that a (k + 1)-out-of-(3k− 2u) secret sharing scheme could correct is
⌊
(3k − 2u)− k − 1
2
⌋
=
⌊
2k − 2u− 1
2
⌋
= k − u− 1.
This is a contradiction, which concludes the proof. Q.E.D. ✷
For the sufficient condition, we first show the simple case for u = 1.
Theorem 4.2 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V , and k ≥ 2. If there are 3k − 1
directed node disjoint paths p1, . . . , p3k−1 from A to B and one directed path q from B to
A (q is node disjoint from p1, . . . , p3k−1) then there is a (0, 0)-secure message transmission
protocol from A to B against a k-active adversary.
Proof. In the following protocol π, A (0, 0)-securely transmits MA ∈R F to B:
Step 1 Both A and B sets I = 1.
Step 2 A constructs (k + 1)-out-of-(3k − 1) MDS secret shares (sA1,I , ..., s
A
3k−1,I) of M
A.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k − 1, A sends sAi,I to B via the path pi.
Step 3 For each i ≤ 3k− 1, B receives sBi,I on path pi. By correcting at most k− 1 errors,
B recovers a value MˆBI from these shares. B sends s
B
I,I to A via the path q.
Step 4 A receives s¯AI,I from q. A distinguishes the following two cases:
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1. s¯AI,I = s
A
I,I . A reliably sends “path pI maybe OK”, sets I = I+1. If I > 3k−1
then goes to Step 6, otherwise, goes to Step 2.
2. s¯AI,I 6= s
A
I,I . A reliably sends “path pI or q is faulty”. A constructs k-out-of-
(3k − 2) MDS secret shares {rAi,I : i 6= I, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k − 1} of M
A. For each
i ≤ 3k − 1 such that i 6= I, A sends rAi,I to B via the path pi. A terminates
the protocol.
Step 5 B distinguishes the following two cases:
1. B reliably receives “path pI maybe OK”. B sets I = I+1. If I > 3k− 1 then
goes to Step 6, otherwise, goes to Step 2.
2. B reliably receives “path pI or q is faulty”. In this case, B also receives r
B
i,I
from path pi for each i 6= I. By correcting at most k − 1 errors, B recovers
MB from these shares and terminates the protocol.
Step 6 B checks whether MˆBi = Mˆ
B
j for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3k−1. If all these values are equal,
then B sets MB = MˆB1 , sends “stop” to A via q, and terminates the protocol.
Otherwise, B sends the shares (sB1,3k−1, ..., s
B
3k−1,3k−1) to A via q.
Step 7 A distinguishes the following two cases:
1. A receives (s¯A1,3k−1, ..., s¯
A
3k−1,3k−1) on the path q. A computes P = {i :
s¯Ai,3k−1 6= s
A
i,3k−1}, reliably sends P to B, and terminates the protocol.
2. A receives anything else. A terminates the protocol.
Step 8 B reliable receives P from A, recovers MB from the shares {sBi,3k−1 : i /∈ P}, and
terminates the protocol.
Since there could be k faulty paths from A to B, and a (k + 1)-out-of-(3k− 1) MDS secret
sharing scheme can correct at most k − 1 errors and simultaneously detect k − 1 errors. B
may recover an incorrect message MˆBI in Step 3. B therefore needs to verify whether it has
recovered the correct message in the following steps. Note that if q is faulty, then B must
have recovered the correct message in Step 3 for each I. In Step 3, B also sends sBI,I to A
via the path q. This does not violate the perfect privacy property since if there are k − 1
faulty paths from A to B, then the adversary gets at most k shares including this share,
and if there are k faulty paths from A to B, then the adversary does not control the path q
and does not get this share.
In Step 4, if s¯AI,I = s
A
I,I , then it could be the case that s
B
I,I = s
A
I,I or it could be the case
that the path q is faulty. In any case, we have to continue the protocol further. However, if
s¯AI,I 6= s
A
I,I , then A is convinced that either pI or q is faulty. Since a k-out-of-(3k− 2) MDS
secret sharing scheme could correct k − 1 errors and detect k − 1 errors simultaneously. B
will recover the correct message in Step 5.
Now assume that B does not recover the correct message at the end of round I = 3k−1.
We can distinguish the following two cases:
• B recovers the same message MˆBI in all 3k− 1 rounds. If this happens, B is convinced
that this uniquely recoveredmessage is the correct message. Note that this follows from
the following two arguments: If the path q is faulty, then obviously B has recovered
the same correct message in each round. If the path q is non-faulty and we assume
that the path pt (1 ≤ t ≤ 3k − 1) is faulty, then in order for the adversary to avoid
being caught by A in round t, pt must behave nicely in round t, that is, s
A
t,t = s
B
t,t
10
(otherwise A has identified that q or pt is faulty in round t). Thus there are at most
k−1 errors in the shares that B received in round t and B recovers the correct message
in round t.
• B recovers different messages in these 3k− 1 rounds. This happens only if q is honest.
Thus, B could send the shares it receives in round 3k−1 to A via path q and A can tell
B which shares are incorrect. Thus B could recover the correct message from these
non-faulty shares (there are at least 2k − 1 non-faulty shares).
The above arguments show that the protocol π is (0, 0)-secure against a k-active adversary.
Q.E.D. ✷
Theorem 4.3 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V , and k ≥ 2. If there are n =
max{3k+1− 2u, 2k+1} directed node disjoint paths p1, . . . , pn from A to B and u directed
path q1, . . . , qu from B to A (q1, . . . , qu are node disjoint from p1, . . . , pn) then there is a
(0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active adversary.
Proof. For u = 1 or k = 2, the result is proved in Theorem 4.2. We prove the theorem
by induction. Assume that u > 1, k > 2, and the theorem holds for u− 1 and k − 1. In the
following, we show that the Theorem holds for u and k by induction.
Let H = {hI : hI = 〈pI1 , . . . , pIu〉} be the set of all ordered u-subsets of {p1, . . . , pn}.
Then |H| = n!(n−u)! . In the following protocol π, A (0, 0)-securely transmits M
A ∈R F to B:
Step 1 Both A and B set I = 1.
Step 2 A constructs (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret shares (sA1,I , ..., s
A
n,I) of M
A. For each
i ≤ n, A sends sAi,I to B via the path pi.
Step 3 For each i ≤ n, B receives (or sets default) sBi,I on path pi. By correcting at most
k − u errors, B recovers a value MˆBI from these shares. For each i ≤ u, B sends
sBIi,I to A via the path qi. Note that we assume hI = 〈pI1 , . . . , pIu〉 here.
Step 4 For each i ≤ u, A receives (or sets default) s¯AIi,I from qi. A distinguishes the
following two cases:
1. s¯AIi,I = s
A
Ii,I
for all i ≤ u. A reliably sends “paths in hI maybe OK”, sets
I = I + 1. If I > |H| then A goes to Step 6, otherwise, goes to Step 2.
2. s¯AIi0 ,I
6= sAIi0 ,I
for some i0 ≤ u. A reliably sends “path pIi0 or qi0 is faulty”.
A goes to the (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol against a (k− 1)-
active adversary on the paths {pi : i 6= Ii0} ∪ {qi : i 6= i0} to transmit M
A
to B (here we use induction).
Step 5 B distinguishes the following two cases:
1. B reliably receives “paths in hI maybe OK”. B sets I = I + 1. If I > |H|
then goes to Step 6, otherwise, goes to Step 2.
2. B reliably receives “path pIi0 or qi0 is faulty”. In this case, B goes to the
(0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol against a (k−1)-active adversary
on the paths {pi : i 6= Ii0} ∪ {qi : i 6= i0} and receives the message M
B.
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Step 6 B computes whether MˆBi = Mˆ
B
j for all i, j ≤ |H|. If all these values are equal,
then B sets MB = MˆB1 , sends “stop” to A via all paths qi, and terminates the
protocol. Otherwise, B goes to Step 8.
Step 7 If A receives “stop” on all paths q1, . . . , qu, then A terminates the protocol,
otherwise, A goes to Step 8.
Step 8 A chooses RA1 ∈R F, constructs (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret shares (s
A
1 , . . . , s
A
n )
of RA1 , and sends s
A
i to B via path pi for each i ≤ n.
Step 9 For each i ≤ n, B receives (or sets default) sBi on path pi. B distinguishes the
following two cases:
1. There are errors in the shares (sB1 , . . . , s
B
n ). In this case, for each j ≤ u, B
sends (sB1 , . . . , s
B
n ) to A via the path qj . Note that a (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS
secret sharing scheme could be used to detect n− k − 1 ≥ k errors.
2. There is no error in the shares (sB1 , . . . , s
B
n ). B recovers the value R
B
1 from
these shares and for each j ≤ u, B sends “OK” to A via path qj .
Step 10 For each j ≤ u, A receives (or sets default) (s¯A1,j , . . . , s¯
A
n,j) from the path qj . A
distinguishes the following two cases:
1. s¯Ai0,j0 6= s
A
i0
for some i0 ≤ n and j0 ≤ u. A reliably sends “path pi0 or qj0
is faulty” to B. A goes to the (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol
against a (k − 1)-active adversary on the paths {pi : i 6= i0} ∪ {qj : j 6= j0}
to transmit MA to B (here we use induction again).
2. All other cases. A reliably transmits “continue the protocol” to B and goes
to Step 12.
Step 11 B distinguishes the following two cases:
1. B reliably receives “continue the protocol”. B goes to Step 12.
2. B reliably receives “path pi0 or qj0 is faulty”. In this case, B goes to the
(0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol against a (k−1)-active adversary
on the paths {pi : i 6= i0} ∪ {qj : j 6= j0} and receives the message MB.
Step 12 A computes RA2 = M
A − RA1 , constructs (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret shares
(sA1 , . . . , s
A
n ) of R
A
2 , and sends s
A
i to B via path pi for each i ≤ n.
Step 13 For each i ≤ n, B receives (or sets default) sBi on path pi. B distinguishes the
following two cases:
1. There are errors in the shares (sB1 , . . . , s
B
n ). In this case, for each j ≤ u, B
sends (sB1 , . . . , s
B
n ) to A via the path qj .
2. There is no error in the shares (sB1 , . . . , s
B
n ). B recovers the value R
B
2 from
these shares, computes the secret MB = RB1 + R
B
2 , and for each j ≤ u, B
sends “OK” to A via path qj . B terminates the protocol.
Step 14 For each j ≤ u, A receives (or sets default) (s¯A1,j , . . . , s¯
A
u,j) from the path qj . A
distinguishes the following two cases:
1. s¯Ai0,j0 6= s
A
i0
for some i0 ≤ n and j0 ≤ u. A reliably sends “path pi0 or qj0
is faulty” to B. A goes to the (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol
against a (k − 1)-active adversary on the paths {pi : i 6= i0} ∪ {qj : j 6= j0}
to transmit MA to B.
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2. All other cases. A reliably transmits “the protocol is complete” to B and
terminates the protocol.
Step 15 B distinguishes the following two cases:
1. B reliably receives “the protocol is complete”. B terminates the protocol.
2. B reliably receives “path pi0 or qj0 is faulty”. In this case, B goes to the
(0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol against a (k−1)-active adversary
on the paths {pi : i 6= i0} ∪ {qj : j 6= j0} and receives the message MB.
Since there could be k faulty paths from A to B, and a (k+1)-out-of-n MDS secret sharing
scheme in Steps 2 and 3 can correct at most k − u errors and simultaneously detect k − u
errors. B may recover an incorrect message MˆBI in Step 3. B therefore needs to verify
whether it has recovered the correct message in the following steps. Note that if all the
paths from B to A are faulty, then B must have recovered the correct message in Step 3 for
each I ≤ |H|. In Step 3, B also sends sBIi,I to A via the path qi. This will not violate the
perfect privacy property since if there are t faulty paths from B to A, then the adversary
gets k − t shares from the A to B paths and t shares from the B to A paths. That is, the
adversary gets at most k shares.
In Step 4, if s¯AIi,I = s
A
Ii,I
for all i ≤ u, then for each i ≤ u, it could be the case that
sBIi,I = s
A
Ii,I
or it could be the case that the path qi is faulty. In any case, we have to continue
the protocol further. However, if s¯AIi0 ,I
6= sAIi0 ,I
for some i0 ≤ u, then A is convinced that
either pIi0 or qi0 is faulty. Thus if we delete the two paths pIi0 and qi0 , we have at most
k − 1 unknown faulty paths, n− 1 paths from A to B, and u− 1 paths from B to A. Since
max{3(k − 1) + 1− 2(u− 1), 2(k − 1) + 1} = max{3k − 2u− 4, 2k − 1}
≤ max{3k − 2u, 2k}
= n− 1,
there is (by induction) a (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B against a
(k − 1)-active adversary on the paths {pi : i 6= Ii0} ∪ {qi : i 6= i0}, B recovers the correct
message MB in Step 5.
Assume that B does not recover the correct message at the beginning of Step 6. If B
recovers the same value MˆBI in all the |H| rounds between Step 2 and Step 5, then B is
convinced that this uniquely recovered value is the correct message. Note that this follows
from the following arguments:
• All paths q1, . . . , qu from B to A are faulty. In this case B obviously has recovered the
correct message in each round.
• There is non-faulty path from B to A. In this case, let t ≥ 1, qi1 , . . . , qit be a list of
all non-faulty paths from B to A, pj1 , . . . , pjt be faulty, and hI = 〈pI1 , . . . , pIu〉 with
Ii1 = j1, . . . , Iit = jt. If (s
B
1,I , ..., s
B
n,I) is the shares that B receives in Step 3 of round
I, then sBj1,I = s
A
j1,I
, . . ., sBjt,I = s
A
jt,I
(otherwise A identifies that some qi or pj is faulty
in round I). That is, there are at most k − u errors in the shares (sB1,I , ..., s
B
n,I), and
B recovers the correct secret message in round I.
Now assume that B does not recover the correct message at the beginning of Step 6 and
B recovers different values in these |H| rounds between Step 2 and Step 5. If this happens,
then there must be non-faulty paths from B to A. In this case, both A and B continues
the protocol from Step 8. During Step 8 and Step 15, A tries to send RA1 and R
A
2 to B
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using the (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret sharing scheme. Since there are at most k faulty
paths, and a (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret sharing scheme could be used to correct 0 error
and simultaneously detect at least k errors, any error in these shares could be detected
by B in Steps 9 and 13. Since there are non-faulty paths from B to A, any errors in
these shares will be reported back A via the non-faulty B to A paths. Thus A initiates a
(0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol against a (k − 1)-active adversary on the paths
{pi : i 6= i0} ∪ {qj : j 6= j0} in Step 10 or Step 14 and B will receive the secret. If any error
occurs in these cases, B reports either the shares of RA1 or the shares of R
A
2 (but not both)
to A via the B to A paths. Thus we have achieved the perfect privacy here. On the other
hand, if there is no error in these shares of RA1 and R
A
2 , then B recovers the correct secret
MB = RB1 +R
B
2 .
We therefore proved that the protocol π is (0, 0)-secure against a k-active adversary.
Q.E.D. ✷
In Theorem 4.3, we have the restriction that k ≥ 2. In the following we show a sufficient
condition which is applicable to k = 1.
Theorem 4.4 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V . If there are 3k directed node
disjoint paths p1, . . . , p3k from A to B and one directed path q from B to A (q is node
disjoint from p1, . . . , p3k) then there is a (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol from A
to B against a k-active adversary.
Proof. In the following protocol π, A (0, 0)-securely transmits MA ∈R F to B.
Step 1 A constructs (k + 1)-out-of-3k MDS secret shares vA = (sA1 , ..., s
A
3k) of M
A. For
each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k, A sends si to B via the path pi.
Step 2 Let vB = (sB1 , ..., s
B
3k) be the shares B receives. If B finds that there are at most
k − 1 errors, B recovers MB from the shares, sends “stop” to A via the path q,
and terminates the protocol. Otherwise there are k errors. In this case B sends
vB back to A via the path q (note that q is an honest path in this case).
Step 3 A distinguishes the following two cases:
1. A receives v¯A = (s¯A1 , ..., s¯
A
3k) from the path q. A reliably sends P = {i : s
A
i 6=
s¯Ai } to B.
2. A received “stop” or anything else via q. A terminates the protocol.
Step 4 B reliably receives P from A. B recovers MB from the shares {sBi : i /∈ P} and
terminates the protocol (note that |{sBi : i /∈ P}| = 2k).
Note that if B sends vB to A in Step 2 then k paths from A to B are corrupted and the
path q is honest. Thus the adversary will not learn vB . If the adversary controls the path q,
then it may change the message “stop” to something else. In this case, A will not be able to
identify the corrupted paths from A to B. However, since B has already recovered the key,
B will just ignore the next received message. It is straightforward to show that the protocol
is (0, 0)-secure. Q.E.D. ✷
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5 Efficient (0, 0)-secure message transmission in directed
graphs
In the previous section, we proved a necessary and sufficient condition for (0, 0)-secure mes-
sage transmission from A to B. Our protocols in these proofs are not efficient (exponential
in k). In this section, we show that if there are totally 3k+1 paths between A and B, then
there are efficient (linear in u) (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocols from A to B.
Theorem 5.1 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V and k ≥ u. If there are n = 3k+
1− u directed node disjoint paths p1, . . . , pn from A to B and u directed node disjoint paths
q1, . . . , qu from B to A (q1, . . . , qu are node disjoint from p1, . . . , pn) then there is an efficient
(0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active adversary.
Proof. If we replace the steps between Step 1 and Step 7 of the protocol π in the proof
of Theorem 4.3 with the following steps:
Step 1 A constructs (k+1)-out-of-nMDS secret shares (sA1 , ..., s
A
n ) ofM
A. For each i ≤ n,
A sends sAi to B via the path pi.
Step 2 For each i ≤ n, B receives (or sets default) sBi on path pi. If there are at most
k − u errors in the shares (sB1 , ..., s
B
n ), then B recovers the secret message M
B
from these shares by correcting the errors, sends “stop” to A via all paths qi, and
terminates the protocol. Otherwise, B sends “continue the protocol” to A via all
paths qi and goes to Step 8 of the protocol π.
Step 3 If A receives “stop” on all paths q1, . . . , qu, then A terminates the protocol, oth-
erwise, A goes to Step 8 of the protocol π.
Note that a (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret sharing scheme could be used to detect k errors
and simultaneously correct k − u errors. Thus if all the paths q1, . . . , qu are controlled by
the adversary, then B recovers the secret message MB in Step 2. If at least one path from
B to A is not controlled by the adversary, then the protocol π in the proof of Theorem
4.3 starting from Step 8 will let B to recover the secret message MB. Here we should
also note that the induction initiated in Step 10 or Step 14 of the protocol π works since
3k+1− u− 1 = 3k− u > 3(k− 1)+ 1− (u− 1). It is straightforward that the protocol will
terminates in at most 11u steps. Q.E.D. ✷
In the previous theorems, including Theorem 5.1, we have the restriction that the directed
paths from B to A are all node disjoint from the directed paths from A to B. In the following
theorem we partially remove this restriction.
Theorem 5.2 Let G(V,E) be a directed graph, A,B ∈ V . Assume that there are n =
3k+ 1− u ≥ 2k+ 1 (which implies k ≥ u) directed node disjoint paths p1, . . . , pn from A to
B and u node disjoint directed paths q1, . . . , qu from B to A. If 3k + 1 − 2u paths among
these 3k+1−u paths from A to B are node disjoint from the u paths from B to A, then there
is an efficient (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active
adversary.
Proof. We note that the proof of Theorem 5.1 could not be used here since if we remove
(in the induction step) two paths pi and qj such that one of them is corrupted, we are not
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guaranteed that the k-active adversary becomes a (k − 1)-active adversary (qj may share a
node with some other directed paths from A to B and that node could be corrupted).
First we describe the proof informally. The protocol is divided into two phases. In phase
one of the protocol, A tries to transmit the secret message to B assuming at least one of
the directed paths from B to A is not corrupted. This is done by running u concurrent
sub-protocols in phase one, in each sub-protocol B uses one of the directed paths from B to
A to send some feedback information to A. In the second phase of the protocol, A transmits
shares of the secret message through the A to B paths excluding these paths which have
intersection with B to A paths. B will use the information received in the second phase
only if B detects that all directed paths from B to A are corrupted in phase one.
In phase one, A and B execute the following protocol on the path set {pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪{q}
for each directed path q from B to A. First A chooses R0 ∈R F and sends shares of R0
to B via the paths p1, . . . , pn using a (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret sharing scheme. If B
can correct the errors in the received shares (that is, there were at most k − u errors), B
recovers R0. Otherwise B needs help from A and B sends the received shares back to A via
the B to A path q. The problems are that: B may receive help even if B has never asked
for. However B can detect this. Therefore B always works with A on such a protocol and
recovers the correct R0. Then A sends R1 =M
A −R0 using a (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS secret
sharing scheme. If B can correct the errors in the received shares of R1, B has found the
secret and can terminate the protocol. If B cannot correct these errors, B needs to continue
the protocol. In this situation, B distinguishes the following two cases:
1. B has not asked for help in the transmission of R0. B can ask for help now and B will
then recover the secret MA.
2. B has asked for help in the transmission of R0. In this case B cannot ask for help
(otherwise the adversary may learn both the values of R0 and R1 and thus may recover
the secret). The sub-protocol needs to be restarted (that is, A constructs different R0
and R1 for M
A and sends them to B again). Each time when A and B restart this
sub-protocol, A sends the shares of R0 and R1 only via these “non-corrupted” paths
from A to B. The “non-corrupted” paths are computed from the feedbacks that A
has received from the path q. If q is not corrupted, then the computation is reliable.
However, if q is corrupted, then the computation is unreliable. If there is at least one
non-corrupted path qi0 from B to A, then B recovers the secret from the sub-protocol
running on the path set {p1, . . . , pn} ∪ {qi0}. Otherwise B cannot recover the secret
in phase one and we will go to phase two.
IfB asks for help in the transmission ofR0, then both A andB “identify” the corrupted paths
from A and B according to the information that B sends to A via the path q. If k′ dishonest
paths from A to B have been (correctly or incorrectly) identified at the restart of the sub-
protocol, A uses a (k + 1)-out-of-(3k + 1 − u − k′) MDS secret sharing scheme. This MDS
secret sharing scheme will only be used for error detection (or message recovery in the case
that no error occurs), thus it can be used to detect 3k+1−u−k′−k−1 = 2k−u−k′ ≥ k−k′
errors. Due to the fact that this MDS secret sharing scheme cannot detect k errors we need
to organize ourselves that B will never use incorrectly identified paths from A to B since
otherwise B could compute the incorrect “secret”. This is easy to be addressed by having
B detect whether the path q from B to A is dishonest or not. This is done by having A
reliably send to B what A received via the path q. Since a (k+1)-out-of-(3k+1− u) MDS
secret sharing scheme can detect k errors and simultaneously correct k − u errors, both A
and B identify at least k′ ≥ k − u + 1 dishonest paths from A to B in the first run of the
sub-protocol. During each following run of the sub-protocol, B will either recover the secret
16
message (when no error occurs) or detect at least one corrupted path from A to B (A could
also detect the corrupted path from A to B according to the information A received on the
path q). Thus the sub-protocol will be restarted at most u times.
In phase two of the protocol, A constructs (k + 1)-out-of-(3k + 1 − 2u) MDS shares
(s1, . . . , s3k+1−2u) of the secret M
A and sends these shares to B via the 3k + 1− 2u paths
which are node disjoint from the paths from the u paths from B to A. Note that if B has
determined that all these u paths from B to A have been corrupted in phase one, then B
recovers the secret MA from the received shares (sB1 , . . . , s
B
3k+1−2u) in phase two since a
(k + 1)-out-of-(3k + 1 − 2u) MDS secret sharing scheme can be used to detect and correct
k − u errors simultaneously. Note that if at least one path from B to A is honest in phase
one, then B has recovered the secret in phase and can just ignore this last message.
Now we present the entire protocol formally.
Step 1 B sets BA BAD = ∅. For each directed path q from B to A, A and B run the
sub-protocol between Step 2 and Step 11 (the sup-protocols for the u paths could
be run parallely).
Step 2 A sets AB CHANNELA = {p1, . . . , pn} and j
A = 0. B sets AB CHANNELB =
{p1, . . . , pn} and jB = 0.
Step 3 Let nj = |AB CHANNEL
A|. A chooses R0 ∈R F, and constructs (k + 1)-out-
of-nj MDS secret shares {s
A
i : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
A} of R0. For each pi ∈
AB CHANNELA, A sends sAi to B via the path pi.
Step 4 For each pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B, B receives sBi from A via the path pi. B distin-
guishes the following two cases:
1. B can recover R0. If j = 0 and there are at most k − u errors, B recovers
R0 by correcting the errors (note that a (k + 1)-out-of-n MDS scheme can
be used to detect k errors and simultaneously correct k−u errors). If j > 0,
then B recovers R0 only if there is no error in the received shares. B sends
“ok” to A via the path q.
2. B cannot recover R0. B sends {s
B
i : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B} to A via the
path q.
Step 5 A distinguishes the following two cases:
1. A receives “ok” via the path q. A reliably sends “ok” to B.
2. A receives {s¯Bi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
A} (or sets default values if the re-
ceived values are not in valid format). A sets BADA = {pi : s¯Bi 6= s
A
i }
and reliably sends {s¯Bi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
A} and BADA to B. A sets
AB CHANNELA = AB CHANNELA \ BADA,
Step 6 B distinguishes the following two cases:
1. B reliably receives “ok” from A. If B sent “ok” to A in the Step 4, then
goes to Step 7. Otherwise, B sets BA BAD = BA BAD ∪ {q} and goes to
Step 11.
2. B reliably receives {s¯Bi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B} and BADB from A. If
s¯Bi = s
B
i for all pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B, then B sets AB CHANNELB =
AB CHANNELB \ BADB, recovers R0 from {s
B
i : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B},
and goes to Step 7. Otherwise, B sets BA BAD = BA BAD∪ {q} and goes
to Step 11.
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Step 7 Let nj = |AB CHANNEL
A|. A constructs (k + 1)-out-of-nj MDS secret shares
{sAi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
A} of R1 =MA−R0. For each pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
A,
A sends sAi to B via the path pi.
Step 8 For each pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B, B receives sBi from A via the path pi. B distin-
guishes the following two cases:
1. B can recover R1. B recovers R1 only if there is no error in the received
shares. B sends “ok” to A via the path q.
2. B cannot recover R1. For this situation we need to distinguish two cases:
2.a) B sent “ok” to A in Step 4. That is, B has not asked for help to recover
R0. Then B can ask for help now. B sends {sBi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B}
to A via the path q.
2.b) B sent the received shares to A in Step 4. That is, B has asked for help
to recover R0. Then B cannot ask for help now. B sends “continue to
the next round” to A via the path q.
Step 9 A distinguishes the following three cases:
1. A receives “ok” via the path q. A reliably sends “ok” to B.
2. A receives “continue to the next round” via the path q. A sets jA = jA+1,
reliably sends “continue to the next round” to B, and goes to Step 3.
3. A receives {s¯Bi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
A} (or sets default values if the re-
ceived values are in invalid format). A sets BADA = {pi : s¯Bi 6= s
A
i },
AB CHANNELA = AB CHANNELA \BADA, and reliably sends {s¯Bi : pi ∈
AB CHANNELA} and BADA to B.
Step 10 B distinguishes the following three cases:
1. B reliably receives “ok” from A. If B sent “ok” to A in the Step 8, then
B has recovered the secret. B terminates the entire protocol. Otherwise, B
sets BA BAD = BA BAD ∪ {q} and goes to Step 11.
2. B reliably receives “continues to the next round”. If B sent “continues to
the next round” to A in the Step 8, then B sets jB = jB + 1 and goes to
Step 3. Otherwise, B sets BA BAD = BA BAD ∪ {q} and goes to Step 11.
3. B reliably receives {s¯Bi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B} and BADB from A. If
s¯Bi = s
B
i for all pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B, then B sets AB CHANNELB =
AB CHANNELB \ BADB, recovers R1 from {sBi : pi ∈ AB CHANNEL
B},
recovers the secret MB from both R0 and R1, and terminates the entire
protocol. Otherwise, B sets BA BAD = BA BAD ∪ {q} and goes to Step
11.
Step 11 B waits until all u sub-protocols in phase one finish. If |BA BAD| = u then B
goes to Step 12. Otherwise, B has recovered the secret message, thus terminates
the entire protocol.
Step 12 A constructs (k + 1)-out-of-(3k + 1 − 2u) MDS shares (s1, . . . , s3k+1−2u) of the
secret MA and sends these shares to B via the 3k + 1 − 2u paths which are
node disjoint from the u B to A paths. Note that if |BA BAD| = u, then B can
recover the secret message MB from the received shares (sB1 , . . . , s
B
3k+1−2u) since
a (k + 1)-out-of-(3k + 1− 2u) MDS secret sharing scheme can be used to detect
and correct k − u errors simultaneously.
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It is straightforward to show that at the beginning of each run of the sub-protocol be-
tween Step 2 and Step 11, Both A and B have the same sets of AB CHANNEL, that is,
AB CHANNELA = AB CHANNELB at Step 2. From the analysis before the above pro-
tocol, it is straightforward that the above protocol is a (0, 0)-secure message transmission
protocol against a k-active adversary. Q.E.D. ✷
6 Secure message transmissions in hypergraphs
Applications of hypergraphs in secure communications have been studied by Franklin and
Yung in [8]. A hypergraphH is a pair (V,E) where V is the node set and E is the hyperedge
set. Each hyperedge e ∈ E is a pair (A,A∗) where A ∈ V and A∗ is a subset of V . In a
hypergraph, we assume that any message sent by a node A will be received identically by
all nodes in A∗, whether or not A is faulty, and all parties outside of A∗ learn nothing about
the content of the message.
Let A,B ∈ V be two nodes of the hypergraph H(V,E). We say that there is a “direct
link” from node A to node B if there exists a hyperedge (A,A∗) such that B ∈ A∗. We say
that there is an “undirected link” from A to B if there is a directed link from A to B or a
directed link from B to A. If there is a directed (undirected) link from Ai to Ai+1 for every
i, 0 ≤ i < k, then we say that there is a “directed path” (“undirected path”) from A0 to Ak.
A and B are “strongly k-connected” (“weakly k-connected”) in the hypergraph H(V,E) if for
all S ⊂ V − {A,B}, |S| < k, there remains a directed (undirected) path from A to B after
the removal of S and all hyperedges (X,X∗) such that S ∩ (X∗ ∪ {X}) 6= ∅. Franklin and
Yung [8] showed that reliable and private communication from A to B is possible against
a k-passive adversary if and only if A and B are strongly 1-connected and weakly (k + 1)-
connected. It should be noted that B and A are strongly k-connected does not necessarily
mean that A and B are strongly k-connected.
Following Franklin and Yung [8], and, Franklin and Wright [7], we consider multicast
as our only communication primitive in this section. A message that is multicast by any
node A in a hypergraph is received by all nodes A∗ with privacy (that is, nodes not in A∗
learn nothing about what was sent) and authentication (that is, nodes in A∗ are guaranteed
to receive the value that was multicast and to know which node multicast it). We assume
that all nodes in the hypergraph know the complete protocol specification and the complete
structure of the hypergraph.
Definition 6.1 Let H(V,E) be a hypergraph, A,B ∈ V be distinct nodes of H, and k ≥ 0.
A, B are k-separable in H if there is a node set W ⊂ V with at most k nodes such that any
directed path from A to B goes through at least one node in W . We say that W separates
A,B.
Remark. Note that there is no straightforward relationship between strong connectivity
and separability in hypergraphs.
Theorem 6.2 Let H(V,E) be a hypergraph, A,B ∈ V be distinct nodes of H, and k ≥ 0.
The nodes A and B are not 2k-separable if and only if there are 2k+1 directed node disjoint
paths from A to B in H.
Proof. This follows directly from the maximum-flow minimum-cut theorem in classical
graph theory. For details, see, e.g., [6]. Q.E.D. ✷
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Theorem 6.3 Let H(V,E) be a hypergraph, A,B ∈ V be distinct nodes of H, and k ≥ 0.
A necessary and sufficient condition for reliable message transmission from A to B against
a k-active adversary is that A and B are not 2k-separable in H.
Proof. First assume that A and B cannot be separated by a 2k-node set. By Theorem
6.2, there are 2k + 1 directed node disjoint paths from A to B in H . Thus reliable message
transmission from A to B is possible.
Next assume that A and B can be separated by a 2k-node set W in H . We shall show
that reliable message transmission is impossible. Suppose that π is a message transmission
protocol from A to B and let W = W0 ∪ W1 be a 2k-node separation of A and B with
W0 and W1 each having at most k nodes. Let m0 be the message that A transmits. The
adversary will attempt to maintain a simulation of the possible behavior of A by executing
π for message m1 6= m0. The strategy of the adversary is to flip a coin and then, depending
on the outcome, decide which set of W0 or W1 to control. Let Wb be the chosen set. In
each execution step of the transmission protocol, the adversary causes each node in Wb to
follow the protocol π as if the protocol were transmitting the message m1. This simulation
succeeds with nonzero probability. Since B does not know whether b = 0 or b = 1, at the
end of the protocol B cannot decide whether A has transmitted m0 or m1 if the adversary
succeeds. Thus with nonzero probability, the reliability is not achieved. Q.E.D. ✷
Theorem 6.3 gives a sufficient and necessary condition for achieving reliable message trans-
mission against a k-active adversary over hypergraphs. In the following example, we show
that this condition is not sufficient for achieving privacy against a k-active adversary (indeed,
even not for a k-passive adversary).
Example 1 Let H(V,Eh) be the hypergraph in Figure 1 where V = {A, B, v1, v2, v, u1, u2}
and Eh = {(A, {v1, v2}), (v1, {v,B}), (v2, {v,B}), (A, {u1, u2}), (u1, {v,B}), (u2, {v,B})}.
Then the nodes A and B are not 2-separable in H. Theorem 6.3 shows that reliable message
transmission from A to B is possible against a 1-active adversary. However, the hypergraph
H is not weakly 2-connected (the removal of the node v and the removal of the corresponding
hyperedges will disconnect A and B). Thus, the result by Franklin and Yung [8] shows that
private message transmission from A to B is not possible against a 1-passive adversary.
Theorem 6.4 Let δ > 0 and A and B be two nodes in a hypergraph H(V,E) satisfying the
following conditions:
1. A and B are not 2k-separable in H.
2. B and A are not 2k-separable in H.
3. A and B are strongly k-connected in H.
Then there is a (0, δ)-secure message transmission protocol from A to B against a k-active
adversary.
Proof. Assume that the conditions of the theorem is satisfied. For each k-node subset
set S of V \{A,B}, let pS be a directed path from A to B which witnesses that A and B are
strongly k-connected by removing the nodes in S and corresponding hyperedges in H . Let
S = {S : S ⊂ V \ {A,B}, |S| = k} and P = {pS : S ∈ S}. Then A transmits the message
MA to B using the following protocol.
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Figure 1: The hypergraph H(V,Eh) in Example 1
Step 1 For each S ∈ S, A chooses a random pair (aS , bS) ∈R F2, and transmits this pair
to B via the path pS .
Step 2 For each S ∈ S, B receives a pair (aBS , b
B
S ) from A via the path pS .
Step 3 For each S ∈ S, B chooses a random rS ∈R F and computes sS = auth(rS ; aBS , b
B
S ).
Step 4 B reliably transmits s = 〈〈rS , sS〉 : S ∈ S〉 to A.
Step 5 A reliably receives the value s = 〈〈rS , sS〉 : S ∈ S〉 from B.
Step 6 A computes the key index setKindex = {iS : sS = auth(rS ; aAS , b
A
S )} and the shared
secret KA =
∑
iS∈Kindex
aAS .
Step 7 A reliably transmits 〈Kindex,MA +KA〉 to B, where MA is the secret message.
Step 8 B reliably receives the value 〈Kindex, c〉 from A. B computes the shared secret
KB =
∑
iS∈Kindex
aBS , and decrypts the message M
B = c−KB.
It is possible that aAS 6= a
B
S but auth(rS ; a
A
S , b
A
S ) = auth(rS ; a
B
S , b
B
S ) for some S ∈ S. However
this probability is negligible. Thus the above protocol is reliable with high probability. Since
A and B are strongly k-connected in H , there is a pair (aS , bS) such that (aS , bS) reliably
reaches B and the adversary cannot infer any information of aS from its view. Thus the
above protocol is (0, δ)-secure against a k-active adversary if one chooses sufficiently large
F. Q.E.D. ✷
The results in Sections 3 and 4 show that the condition in Theorem 6.4 is not necessary.
7 Secure message transmission over neighbor networks
7.1 Definitions
A special case of the hypergraph is the neighbor networks. A neighbor network is a graph
G(V,E). In a neighbor network, a node A ∈ V is called a neighbor of another node B ∈ V
if there is an edge (A,B) ∈ E. In a neighbor network, we assume that any message sent by
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a node A will be received identically by all its neighbors, whether or not A is faulty, and all
parties outside of A’s neighbor learn nothing about the content of the message.
For a neighbor network G(V,E) and two nodes A,B in it, Franklin and Wright [7], and,
Wang and Desmedt [17] showed that if there are n multicast lines (that is, n paths with
disjoint neighborhoods) between A and B and there are at most k malicious (Byzantine
style) processors, then the condition n > k is necessary and sufficient for achieving efficient
probabilistically reliable and perfect private communication.
For each neighbor network G(V,E), there is a hypergraph HG(V,Eh) which is equivalent
to G(V,E) in functionality. HG(V,Eh) is defined by letting Eh be the set of hyperedges
(A,A∗) where A ∈ V and A∗ is the set of neighbors of A.
Let A and B be two nodes in a neighbor network G(V,E). We have the following
definitions:
1. A and B are k-connected in G(V,E) if there are k node disjoint paths between A and
B in G(V,E).
2. A and B are weakly k-hyper-connected in G(V,E) if A and B are weakly k-connected
in HG(V,Eh).
3. A and B are k-neighbor-connected in G(V,E) if for any set V1 ⊆ V \ {A,B} with
|V1| < k, the removal of neighbor(V1) and all incident edges from G(V,E) does not
disconnect A and B, where
neighbor(V1) = V1 ∪ {A ∈ V : thereexistsB ∈ V1(B,A) such that ∈ E} \ {A,B}.
4. A and B are weakly (n, k)-connected if there are n node disjoint paths p1, . . . , pn
between A and B and, for any node set T ⊆ (V \ {A,B}) with |T | ≤ k, there exists
1 ≤ i ≤ n such that all nodes on pi have no neighbor in T .
It is easy to check that the following relationships hold.
weak (n, k − 1)-connectivity (n ≥ k) ⇒ k-neighbor-connectivity ⇒ weak
k-hyper-connectivity ⇒ k-connectivity
In the following examples, we show that these implications are strict.
Example 2 Let G(V,E) be the graph in Figure 2 where V = {A,B,C,D} and E =
{(A,C), (C,B), (A,D), (D,B), (C,D)}. Then it is straightforward to check that G(V,E)
is 2-connected but not weakly 2-hyper-connected.
❤
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Figure 2: The graph G(V,E) in Example 2
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Figure 3: The graph G(V,E) in Example 3
Example 3 Let G(V,E) be the graph in Figure 3 where V = {A,B,C,D, F} and E =
{(A,C), (A,D), (C,B), (D,B), (C,F ), (F,D)}. Then it is straightforward to check that A
and B are weakly 2-hyper-connected but not 2-neighbor-connected.
Example 4 Let G(V,E) be the graph in Figure 4 where V = {A, B, C, D, E, F , G, H}
and E = {(A,C), (C,D), (D,E) (E,B), (A,F ), (F,G), (G,H) (H,B), (C,H), (E,F )}.
Then it is straightforward to check that A and B are 2-neighbor-connected but not weakly
(2, 1)-connected.
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Figure 4: The graph G(V,E) in Example 4
Example 2 shows that k-connectivity does not necessarily imply weak k-hyper-connectivity.
Example 3 shows that weak k-hyper-connectivity does not necessarily imply k-neighbor-
connectivity. Example 4 shows that k-neighbor connectivity does not necessarily imply
weak (n, k − 1)-connectivity for some n ≥ k.
7.2 (0, δ)-Secure message transmission over neighbor networks
Wang and Desmedt [17] have given a sufficient condition for achieving (0, δ)-security message
transmission against a k-active adversary over neighbor networks. In this section, we show
that their condition is not necessary.
Theorem 7.1 (Wang and Desmedt [17]) If A and B are weakly (n, k)-connected for some
k < n, then there is an efficient (0, δ)-secure message transmission between A and B.
The condition in Theorem 7.1 is not necessary. For example, the neighbor network G in
Example 3 is not 2-neighbor-connected, thus not weakly (2, 1)-connected. In the following
we present a (0, δ)-secure message transmission protocol against a 1-active adversary from
A to B for the neighbor network of Example 3 .
Message transmission protocol for neighbor network G in Example 3.
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Step 1 A chooses two random pairs (rA1 , r
A
2 ) ∈R F
2 and (rA3 , r
A
4 ) ∈R F
2. A sends (rA1 , r
A
2 )
to C and (rA3 , r
A
4 ) to D.
Step 2 B chooses two random pairs (rB1 , r
B
2 ) ∈R F
2 and (rB3 , r
B
4 ) ∈R F
2. B sends
(rB1 , r
B
2 ) to C and (r
B
3 , r
B
4 ) to D.
Step 3 C chooses a random pair (a1, b1) ∈R F2. C sends (a1 + rA1 , b1 + r
A
2 ) to A and
(a1 + r
B
1 , b1 + r
B
2 ) to B.
Step 4 D chooses a random pair (a2, b2) ∈R F2. D sends (a2 + rA3 , b2 + r
A
4 ) to A and
(a2 + r
B
3 , b2 + r
B
4 ) to B.
Step 5 From the messages received from C and D, A computes (aA1 , b
A
1 ) and (a
A
2 , b
A
2 ).
Step 6 From the messages received from C and D, B computes (aB1 , b
B
1 ) and (a
B
2 , b
B
2 ).
Step 7 B chooses a random r ∈R F, computes s1 = auth(r; aB1 , b
B
1 ) and s2 = auth(r; a
B
2 , b
B
2 ).
Using the probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol of Franklin and
Wright [7], B transmits 〈r, s1, s2〉 to A.
Step 8 Let 〈rA, sA1 , s
A
2 〉 be the message received by A in the last step, A computes the
key index set Kindex = {i : sAi = auth(r
A; aAi , b
A
i )}. A also computes the shared
secret KA =
∑
i∈Kindex
aAi .
Step 9 Using the probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol of Franklin and
Wright [7], A transmits 〈Kindex,MA+KA〉 to B, whereMA is the secret message.
Step 10 Let 〈KBindex, c
B〉 be the message that B received in the last step. B computes the
shared secret KB =
∑
i∈KB
index
aBi , and decrypts the message M
B = cB −KB.
It is straightforward to check that the above protocol is an efficient (0, δ)-secure message
transmission protocol from A to B against a 1-active adversary.
Example 1 shows that for a general hypergraph, the existence of a reliable message trans-
mission protocol does not imply the existence of a private message transmission protocol. We
show that this is true for probabilistic reliability and perfect privacy in neighbor networks
also.
Example 5 Let G(V,E) be the neighbor network in Figure 5 where V = {A,B,C,D,E, F,
G} and E = {(A,C), (C,D), (D,B), (A,E), (E,F ), (F,B), (G,C), (G,D), (G,E), (G,F )}.
Then there is a probabilistic reliable message transmission protocol from A to B against a
1-active adversary in G. But there is no private message transmission from A to B against
a 1-passive (or 1-active) adversary in G.
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Figure 5: The graph G(V,E) in Example 5
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Proof. It is straightforward to check that G(V,E) is not weakly 2-hyper-connected.
Indeed, in the hypergraph HG(V,Eh) of G(V,E), the removal of node G and the removal
of the corresponding hyperedges will disconnect A and B completely. Thus Franklin and
Yung’s result in [8] shows that there is no private message transmission protocol against
a 1-passive (or 1-active) adversary from A to B. It is also straightforward to check that
Franklin and Wright’s [7] reliable message transmission protocol against a 1-active adversary
works for the two paths (A,C,D,B) and (A,E, F,B). Q.E.D. ✷
Though weak k-hyper-connectivity is a necessary condition for achieving probabilistically
reliable and perfectly private message transmission against a (k− 1)-active adversary, we do
not know whether this condition is sufficient. We conjecture that there is no probabilistically
reliable and perfectly private message transmission protocol against a 1-active adversary for
the weakly 2-hyper-connected neighbor network G(V,E) in Figure 6, where V = {A, B,
C, D, E, F , G, H} and E = {(A,C), (C,D), (D,E), (E,B), (A,F ), (F,G), (G,H),
(H,B), (D,G)}. Note that in order to prove or refute our conjecture, it is sufficient to
show whether there is a probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol against a 1-
active adversary for the neighbor network. For this specific neighbor network, the trick in our
previous protocol could be used to convert any probabilistically reliable message transmission
protocol to a probabilistically reliable and perfectly private message transmission protocol
against a 1-active adversary.
❤
❤ ❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ❤
❤✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍
❍❍❍ ✦✦
✦
A B
C D E
F G H
Figure 6: The graph G(V,E)
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